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FIFTH AMENDMENT-THE ADOPTION
OF THE "SAME ELEMENTS" TEST:




United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993)
I. INTRODUCTION
United States v. Dixon' is a consolidation of two cases from the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals. The defendants in both
cases violated court orders prohibiting them from engaging in crim-
inal conduct. The United States Supreme Court considered
whether the defendants could be prosecuted in separate proceed-
ings both for contempt and for the underlying criminal conduct
without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
The Court ruled that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the
prosecution of certain, but not all, of the underlying criminal of-
fenses after a prosecution for contempt.2 In reaching this conclu-
sion, a bare majority overruled Grady v. Corbin,3 a decision handed
down just three years previously, and held that the test formulated
by the Court in Blockburger v. United States4 was the definitive method
for deciding when a successive prosecution was constitutional.5 In
Dixon, the members of the Court produced five separate opinions
that reveal fundamental differences among the Justices regarding
the scope and purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The most
1 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
2 Id.
3 495 U.S. 508 (1990) (holding that driving while intoxicated and failing to keep to
the right of the median were the same offense as vehicular homicide because all of the
offenses arose out cf the same conduct).
4 284 U.S. 304 (1932) (holding that the offenses of selling narcotics from a package
other than the original stamped package and selling narcotics without a written order
were not the "same" even though both stemmed from the same sale, because each pos-
sessed distinct elements).
5 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2860.
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vigorous disagreement occurred between Justice Scalia and Justice
Souter over which of the Court's prior decisions, Blockburger or
Grady, is more faithful to the Court's precedents and to the historical
purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
This Note argues that the debate between Justices Scalia and
Souter is meaningless and that by indulging in such an exchange the
Justices have failed to develop a test which adequately protects de-
fendants from the evils of double jeopardy. The history of the
Clause and the Court's early precedents are largely irrelevant to
modern double jeopardy jurisprudence because the definition of of-
fenses and the structure of the criminal justice system have changed
dramatically over time. Therefore, this Note proposes that the
Court simply identify the interests protected by the Clause and for-
mulate a test to protect those values in the context of modern soci-
ety. This Note suggests that the Court adopt a "same transaction"
test as it would best protect the interests served by the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause.
II. THE COURT'S HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE DOUBLE
JEOPARDY CLAUSE
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment guaran-
tees that no person shall be "twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"
for the same offense. 6 The Court has long recognized that the
clause offers defendants three distinct constitutional protections:
"It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after
acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same of-
fense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments
for the same offense." 7 While the roots of the Double Jeopardy
Clause date back to antiquity, the guarantee against double jeopardy
seems to be "one of the least understood and, in recent years, one
of the most frequently litigated provisions of the Bill of Rights." 8
In cases involving successive prosecutions after an acquittal or
conviction,9 there has been considerable debate over how courts
6 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy
is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969).
7 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (citations omitted).
8 Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 699 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
9 Because Dixon dealt exclusively with the issue of successive prosecutions for the
same offense, this Note will not examine cases that deal primarily with the bar against
multiple punishments for the same offense. For cases dealing with the multiple punish-
ment issue, see Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376 (1989); United States v. Woodward, 469
U.S. 105 (1985); Ohio v.Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984); Albernaz v. United States, 450
U.S. 333 (1981); Whalen, 445 U.S. at 684; Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978);
770 [Vol. 84
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
should determine whether two offenses are the "same." In Block-
burger v. United States, the Court decided that the proper test should
focus on the elements of the two offense and concluded that two
offenses are distinct if "each provision requires proof of a fact which
the other does not."' 10 Fifty years later, in Grady v. Corbin, the Court
determined that the Blockburger test's focus on the elements of the
offenses charged did not adequately protect defendants from expo-
sure to double jeopardy and concluded that, in addition to examin-
ing the elements of the two offenses, courts must also look to the
underlying conduct of the defendant to determine if two offenses
are the "same." The Court held that if, in a second prosecution, the
government must prove conduct for which the defendant has al-
ready been prosecuted to establish an essential element of an of-
fense charged, the second prosecution is barred by the Double
Jeopardy Clause. I
The debate over which test-the "same elements test" used by
the Court in Blockburger or the "same conduct test" relied upon by
the Court in Grady-best embodies the purpose of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause has haunted the Court for over a century. Two of the
Court's earliest double jeopardy cases reveal an uncertainty as to
whether the "same elements" test or the "same conduct" test is the
proper vehicle for analysis. The Court first looked to the defend-
ant's conduct in In re Nielsen, 12 in which the defendant was convicted
for cohabitation and was later prosecuted for adultery.' 3 The Court
found that the subsequent prosecution for adultery was barred be-
cause when "a person has been tried and convicted for a crime
which has various incidents included in it, he cannot be a second
time tried for one of those incidents without being twice put injeop-
ardy for the same offence."' 4 The Court reasoned that since cohab-
itation and adultery both required proof of the same conduct, living
together as man and wife, they constituted the same offense. 15
Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386
(1958).
10 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (citing Gavieres v. United
States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911)).
11 Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 520 (1990).
12 131 U.S. 176, 185 (1889).
13 Id
14 Id. at 188.
15 Id. at 189; see George C. Thomas III, The Prohibition of Successive Prosecutions for the
Same Offense, 71 IOWA L. REV. 323, 344 (1986) (arguing that "[a] close examination of the
opinion demonstrates that the Nielsen Court probably used [the "same conduct" test]
that forbids a second trial if the prosecution must rely on conduct already used to prove
another offense"); but see United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2860-61 (1993) (argu-
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Twenty years later, in Gavieres v. United States,16 the Court aban-
doned the "same conduct" approach and focused solely on the ele-
ments of the crimes charged. 17 In Gavieres, the Court held that the
Double Jeopardy Clause was not violated when a defendant was
tried in two separate proceedings for offenses arising out of the
same conduct.' 8 The Court reasoned that each offense required
proof of an element that the other did not. Therefore, the offenses
were not the same, and the second prosecution did not constitute
double jeopardy. 19
In Blockburger v. United States, the defendant was prosecuted for
selling narcotics without a written prescription and for selling nar-
cotics from a container other than the original stamped package.20
Citing Gavieres, the Blockburger Court held that although both viola-
tions resulted from a single narcotics sale, the offenses were distinct
because "each provision require[d] proof of a fact which the other
[did] not." 21 In the years after Blockburger, the Court focused exclu-
sively on the elements of offenses to determine if they were the
"same" according to the Double Jeopardy Clause, and only in 1977
did a question develop as to whether the Blockburger test properly
protected defendants from double jeopardy.
The first challenge to the Blockburger "same elements" test arose
in Brown v. Ohio,22 which presented the Court with the question of
whether a prosecution for a lesser included offense barred a prose-
cution for the greater offense. 23 In Brown, a defendant who had
been prosecuted forjoyriding was subsequently prosecuted for auto
theft stemming from the same incident. 24 The Ohio Court of Ap-
peals held that joyriding was the lesser included offense of auto
ing that the Nielsen Court barred the prosecution for adultery because adultery had the
same essential. elements as cohabitation).
16 220 U.S. 338 (1911).
17 Id. at 343-44.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 303-04 (1932).
21 Id. at 304. In 1970, the Court refined the Blockburger test by ruling that the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel, which provides that an issue of ultimate fact cannot be reliti-
gated once it has been decided, was embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Therefore, even if two offenses are distinct under the Blockburger test, a defendant cannot
be retried if the second trial would require relitigating a fact that was resolved in the
defendant's favor in a previous trial. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443-45 (1970).
22 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
23 Id. A lesser included offense is an offense "which is composed.of some, but not all
elements of a greater offense and which does not have any element not included in [the]
greater offense so that it is impossible to commit [the] greater offense without necessar-
ily committing the lesser offense." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 902 (6th ed. 1990).
24 Brown, 432 U.S. at 163.
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theft because "'[e]very element of joyriding] is also an element of
the crime of auto theft. The difference between the crime of steal-
ing a motor vehicle, and [joyriding was] that conviction for stealing
requires proof of an intent on the part of the thief to permanently
deprive the owner of possession.' "25 Citing Blockburger, the Brown
Court held that a defendant who has been prosecuted for a lesser
included offense cannot be retried for the greater offense, because a
lesser included offense "requires no proof beyond that which is re-
quired for a conviction of the greater"; therefore, the two offenses
are the same.26 While Blockburger involved an issue of whether mul-
tiple punishments for the same offense were constitutional, the
Brown Court ruled that "[i]f two offenses are the same under [the
Blockburger] test for purposes of barring consecutive sentences at a
single trial, they necessarily will be the same for purposes of barring
successive prosecutions." 27 Moreover, the Court noted this test em-
bodied the "Court's understanding of the Double Jeopardy Clause
at least since In re Nielsen was decided in 1889."28
Despite Brown's apparent endorsement of a broad application
of the Blockburger test, the Court's opinion created confusion over
what was the appropriate test to apply. The Court stated in a foot-
note that "[t]he Blockburger test is not the only standard for deter-
mining whether successive prosecutions impermissibly involve the
same offense." 29 By coming to apparently inconsistent conclu-
sions-that Blockburger is the proper test in successive prosecution
cases and that Blockburger is not the only test for determining when a
successive prosecution is barred-the Court allowed for differing
opinions as to how to determine the definition of "same." 30
Illinois v. Vitale31 further added to the confusion. In Vitale, the
defendant first pleaded guilty to failure to reduce speed to avoid an
25 Id. at 163-64.
26 Id. at 168. See also Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977). In that case, the
Court concluded that when a defendant has been prosecuted for the greater offense he
cannot be subsequently tried for the lesser offense, because proof of the greater offense
necessarily required the prosecutor to prove all the elements of the lesser offense.
Therefore, the Court held that a charge for robbery with a firearm was precluded by the
DoubleJeopardy Clause, because the defendant had previously been prosecuted for fel-
ony murder with armed robbery as the underlying felony. Id. at 682.
27 Brown, 432 U.S. at 166 (citing In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889)).
28 Id. at 168.
29 Id. at 166 n.6 (citing In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889)).
30 See Thomas, supra note 15, at 348 (arguing that although the Brown Court's hold-
ing is dependent on the Blockburger test, the Court in fact endorsed the "same conduct"
test in dicta by stating that the Blockburger test was only one method for deciding double
jeopardy claims). But see United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2861 (1993) (arguing
that the Brown decision endorsed the "same elements" test).
31 447 U.S. 410 (1980).
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accident and then was charged with involuntary manslaughter stem-
ming from the same accident. 32 The Supreme Court ruled that the
subsequent prosecution for involuntary manslaughter would be
barred if the prosecution had to establish failure to reduce speed to
prove involuntary manslaughter.33 If, however, failure to slow was
not required, "the State may find it necessary to prove a failure to
slow or to rely on conduct necessarily involving such failure [to ob-
tain a conviction for manslaughter] .... In that case, because [the
defendant] has already been convicted for [that] conduct . . . , his
claim of double jeopardy would be substantial . . . ,,34 By sug-
gesting this possibility, the Court seemed to imply that the proper
analysis in double jeopardy claims should focus on the underlying
conduct, rather than the elements of the offense charged.
The Court's decision in Grady v. Corbin appeared to resolve the
issue presented in the hypothetical situation in Vitale by concluding
that when a subsequent prosecution requires proof of conduct for
which the defendant has already been prosecuted, it is barred by the
Double Jeopardy Clause.35 In Grady, the defendant was involved in
an auto accident and pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated and
failing to keep to the right of the median.36 Two months after his
guilty plea, the grand jury charged him with reckless vehicular man-
slaughter, negligent manslaughter and other related charges stem-
ming from the same car accident. 37 In its analysis, the Court
reexamined its decisions on the constitutionality of successive pros-
ecutions38 and concluded that the Court had departed from the
Blockburger decision repeatedly because the "same elements" test
did not adequately protect defendants from double jeopardy. 39
32 Id. at 411-13.
33 Id. at 419. The Court did not make a definitive ruling on the constitutionality of
the manslaughter charge because the Illinois Supreme Court had not clearly delineated
the necessary elements of manslaughter. Consequently, the Court remanded the case
for a definitive ruling as to the necessary elements of manslaughter and a disposition of
the case consistent with the Court's ruling. Id. at 421.
34 Id. at 420.
35 Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521 (1990).
36 Id. at 511-12.
37 Id. at 513-14.
38 Most notably, the Court re-evaluated its decision in Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S.
682 (1977), concluding that under a strict application of Blockburger the two offenses
were not the same because felony murder could be established with any felony, not just
robbery with a firearm, and robbery with a firearm did not require proof of death.
Therefore, the Court decided that the Harris Court did not exclusively rely on the Block-
burger test in concluding that a prosecution for a lesser offense is barred when the de-
fendant has been previously prosecuted for the greater offense. Grady, 495 U.S. at 519-
20.
39 Grady, 495 U.S. at 519-20.
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Thus, rather that strictly adhering to a ineffective precedent, the
Court adopted a two-part test, which it felt better served the inter-
ests of the Clause.40 The Court held that in determining whether a
successive prosecution is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, "a
court must first apply the traditional Blockburger test."4 1 If the prose-
cution fails this test, it is barred. If, however, the prosecution sur-
vives the Blockburger test, it is nonetheless barred if "to establish an
essential element of an offense charged in the second prosecution,
[the government] will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for
which the defendant has already been prosecuted." 42 Applying this
test to the facts of Grady, the Court concluded that the subsequent
prosecutions for homicide and assault were barred because the State
conceded that "it [would] prove the entirety of the conduct for
which [the defendant] was convicted-driving while intoxicated and
failing to keep right of the median-to establish essential elements
of the homicide and assault offenses." 43
Justice Scalia vigorously dissented from the majority's Grady
opinion on two grounds.44 First, he asserted that the majority's con-
clusion that the defendant's conduct was dispositive in double jeop-
ardy claims was contrary to double jeopardy jurisprudence dating
back to English eighteenth century common law. 45 Justice Scalia
specifically attacked the majority's reliance on Vitale as support for
the "same conduct" test, arguing that Vitale's statement that the de-
fendant would have a "substantial" double jeopardy claim if the
prosecution relied on the defendant's conduct in failing to slow to
prove manslaughter was pure dicta and had no foundation in any of
the Court's earlier precedents. 46 Consequently, it provided an inad-
equate foundation for overturning the long-standing Blockburger
40 The Court noted that the Clause was designed to prevent the state, with its supe-
rior resources, from making multiple attempts to convict an individual, thus "subjecting
[the defendant] to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity." Id. at 518 (quoting Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957) (internal quotes omitted)). Further, the Court pointed out
that if the state were allowed to bring repeated prosecutions, the chances of an errone-
ous guilty verdict would increase. Id. (citing Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982)).
41 Id. at 516.
42 Id. at 521.
43 Id at 523.
44 Id. at 526 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy
joined Scalia's dissent.
45 Grady, 495 U.S. at 530-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia contended that the
Blockburger test was proper because it reflected a "venerable understanding" of the pur-
pose and meaning of the DoubleJeopardy Clause, and because the Supreme Court, with
two exceptions, has consistently adhered to the Blockburger test. Id. at 535 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).




Second, Justice Scalia argued that, from a purely linguistic
standpoint, the Blockburger test "best gives effect to the language" of
the Double Jeopardy Clause.48 In his view, the language of the
Clause specifically protects a defendant from being prosecuted twice
for the same offense, not from being prosecuted twice for the same
conduct. 49 Additionally, Justice Scalia maintained that the Clause
presupposes that a double jeopardy determination can be made
before trial; "[o]therwise, the Clause would have prohibited a sec-
ond 'conviction' or 'sentence' for the same offense." 50  The Grady
test cannot definitively resolve double jeopardy claims before trial
because a final disposition is dependent on the evidence the prose-
cution presents at trial. Therefore, Justice Scalia argued that Grady
does not comport with the language of the Clause. 51 In Justice
Scalia's view, the Blockburger test better embodies the language of
the DoubleJeopardy Clause, because by focusing on the elements of
the offense, it can definitively resolve double jeopardy claims before
an unconstitutional trial. 52 It was left for the Court in Dixon to de-
cide if Scalia's arguments in his Grady dissent were persuasive.
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. RESPONDENT ALVIN J. DIXON
On March 9, 1987, Alvin J. Dixon was arrested for second de-
gree murder.53 Pursuant to the District of Columbia's bail law, 54
Dixon was released on bond on the condition that he not commit
"any criminal offense." 55 Dixon's release form specifically stated
that he would be prosecuted for contempt of court if he violated any
conditions of his release.56 In January 1988, while awaiting trial,
Dixon was arrested and indicted for possession of cocaine with in-
47 Id. at 536-38 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 529 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
49 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 529-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
53 Brief for Petitioner at 5, United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993) (No. 91-
1231).
54 District of Columbia law provides that a judicial officer may impose any condition
on an individual that "will reasonably assure the appearance of the person for trial or
the safety of any other person or the community." D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321(a) (1989).
55 United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2853 (1993).
56 Id. District of Columbia law provides that if any conditions are imposed on the
release, the judicial officer shall "issue an appropriate order containing a statement of
the conditions imposed, if any, [and] shall inform such person of the penalties applicable
to violations of the conditions of his release." D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321(d) (1989).
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tent to distribute.57 The superior court judge required Dixon to
demonstrate why he should not be found in contempt of court, or
why the terms of his release should not be modified.58 After a hear-
ing in which the prosecution and defense both presented evidence,
the court determined that the government had established beyond a
reasonable doubt that Dixon was guilty of possession of cocaine
with the intent to distribute. 59 Consequently, the court found Dixon
guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced him to 180 days in jail.60
Thereafter, Dixon moved to dismiss the indictment for posses-
sion of cocaine on grounds that it violated his rights under the
Double Jeopardy Clause.61 The prosecution argued that contempt
of court and possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute were
two different offenses; and therefore the prosecution of both in sep-
arate trials did not constitute double jeopardy.62 The court rejected
the government's argument and dismissed Dixon's indictment.63
The prosecution appealed. 64
B. RESPONDENT MICHAEL FOSTER
Alleging that Michael Foster had repeatedly assaulted her, Fos-
ter's wife, Ana Foster, obtained a civil protection order on August
12, 1987, in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.65 The
order stated that Foster could not "molest, assault, or in any man-
ner threaten or physically abuse" her.66 In August 1988, Foster was
brought before a judge for sixteen alleged violations of that order.67
The relevant contempt charges for violating the protective order ac-
cused Foster of threatening his wife on November 12, 1987, March
26, 1988, and May 17, 1988, and of assaulting her on November 6,
1987, and May 21, 1988.68
57 Brief of Petitioner at 6, Dixon (No. 91-1231); see D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-541(a)(1)
(1993).
58 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2853.
59 United States v. Dixon, 598 A.2d 724, 728 (D.C. 1991), aFfd in part and rev'd in part
and remanded, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
60 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2853. The District of Columbia allows contempt sanctions to
be imposed after an expedited proceeding without ajury and "in accordance with princi-
ples applicable to proceedings for criminal contempt." D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1329(c)
(1989).
61 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2853.
62 Brief for Petitioner at 7, Dixon (No. 91-1231).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 2.
66 Id. at 3.
67 Id.
68 United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2854 (1993).
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Ana Foster's attorney privately prosecuted the contempt
charges, and while the United States was not a party to the action,
the United State's Attorney was aware of the trial.69 To obtain a
conviction for contempt, the court required Foster's wife to prove
the existence of the civil protection order and all the elements of the
underlying criminal offense. 70 After a bench trial, the court found
Foster guilty of violating the terms of the protective order for the
assaults occurring on November 6, 1987, and May 21, 1988; how-
ever, Foster was acquitted of all charges relating to the alleged
threats against his wife.7 ' Foster was sentenced to 600 days
imprisonment. 72
After the contempt trial, the United States Attorney's Office ob-
tained a five count grand jury indictment against Foster that charged
him with one count of simple assault, three counts of threatening his
wife, and one count of assault with intent to kill.73 All of the charges
handed down by the grand jury were based on the exact actions for
which Foster had already been prosecuted for contempt of court.74
Foster filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, claiming that all
charges were barred by the DoubleJeopardy Clause. The trial court
denied his double jeopardy claim, and Foster appealed the ruling.75
C. THE CONSOLIDATED APPEAL
Initially Dixon and Foster's appeals were argued separately;
however, before rendering a decision, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals consolidated the two cases and reheard them en
banc. 76 Concluding that the Supreme Court's decision in Grady was
controlling, the Court of Appeals ruled that all the criminal charges
against the two defendants were barred by the Double Jeopardy
Clause because the conduct underlying both contempt prosecutions
was "the very same conduct for which the government now seeks to
try them." 77 Thus, Grady compelled a conclusion that "those cases
cannot be tried, now or ever." 78 Moreover, the Court found that its








76 Brief for Petitioner at 7, Dixon, (No. 91-1231).
77 United States v. Dixon, 598 A.2d 724, 731 (D.C. 1991).
78 Id.
79 See State v. Kipi, 811 P.2d 815, 820 (Haw. 1991) (holding that a defendant who
778 [Vol. 84
1994] DOUBLE JEOPARDY 779
had been handed down after Grady.80 In those cases, the courts
ruled that when a criminal prosecution seeks to prove conduct for
which a defendant has already been tried in a contempt proceeding,
the prosecution is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.81
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 82 to deter-
mine whether "the Double Jeopardy Clause bars prosecution of a
defendant on substantive criminal charges based upon the same
conduct for which he previously has been held in criminal contempt
of court."8 3
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. JUSTICE SCALIA'S OPINION
Writing for the majority,8 4 Justice Scalia concluded that since
criminal contempt is considered a crime, defendants in nonsum-
mary contempt proceedings,8 5 the type of proceedings Dixon and
Foster faced, must receive all the constitutional safeguards that de-
fendants in criminal trials receive.8 6 Therefore, Dixon and Foster
were protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause during their con-
tempt proceedings.8 7 The majority then explained that, according
to Grady, a prosecution for criminal conduct that had been the basis
of a nonsummary contempt proceeding is constitutional only if the
criminal charge is distinct from the contempt charge according to
pleaded no contest to a criminal contempt charge for violating a protective order could
not be subsequently prosecuted for burglary and terroristic threats "based on the same
conduct that lead to his contempt conviction"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 194 (1991); State v.
Magazine, 393 S.E.2d 385 (S.C. 1990) (holding that according to Grady a defendant who
had been held in contempt of court for violating a protective order could not subse-
quently be tried for criminal assault if the assault charge was based on the same conduct
that supported the contempt charge).
80 Dixon, 598 A.2d at 731.
81 Kipi, 811 P.2d at 820; Magazine, 393 S.E.2d at 387.
82 United States v. Dixon, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992).
83 United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2854 (1993).
84 ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices 0' Connor, Kennedy and Thomas joined Jus-
tice Scalia in Part II of his opinion.
85 A nonsummary contempt proceeding is initiated by the court when an individual
violates specific court orders. In contrast, a summary contempt proceeding is initiated
by the court when an individual's acts in the courtroom interfere with the administration
ofjustice. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2855-56.
86 Id. at 2855-56 (citing Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911)
(providing for the presumption of innocence, the requirement of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, and the guarantee against self-incrimination in nonsummary criminal
contempt proceedings); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925) (providing for the
notice of charges, the assistance of counsel and the right to present a defense to non-
summary criminal contempt proceedings); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (providing
for the right to a public trial in criminal contempt proceedings)).
87 Id.
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both the Blockburger "same elements" test and the Grady "same con-
duct" test.8 8
In Part III of his opinion, Justice Scalia applied the Blockburger
test to the criminal charges against Dixon and Foster.89 Although
only Justice Kennedy joined Justice Scalia's reasoning in Part III, the
concurringJustices formed a majority with respect to the application
of the Blockburger test to the charges against Dixon and Foster.
In Part III(A),90 Justice Scalia concluded that the Blockburger test
prohibited both the prosecution of Dixon for possession of cocaine
with intent to distribute and the prosecution of Foster for simple
assault. 91 Specifically, Justice Scalia reasoned that since Dixon's re-
lease order prohibited him from violating any criminal law, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Criminal Code was effectively incorporated into
the court order.92 Analogizing Dixon's case to Harris v. Oklahoma, 93
Justice Scalia concluded that the incorporation of the District of Co-
lumbia Criminal Code in the court order made the substantive drug
offense a lesser included offense of criminal contempt.94 Therefore,
since Dixon had already been prosecuted for the greater offense-
contempt of court-the subsequent prosecution for the lesser in-
cluded offense of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute was
barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.95 Justice Scalia applied the
same analysis to the simple assault count against Foster and con-
cluded that since the civil protection order forbade Foster from as-
saulting his wife, the simple assault charge was a lesser included
offense of contempt. 96 Thus, it was likewise barred by the Double
Jeopardy Clause.97
However, in Part III(B) of his opinion,98 Justice Scalia con-
cluded that according to the Blockburger test Foster could be tried on
the count of assault with intent to kill and the counts of threatening
his wife, because the criminal prosecution and the contempt prose-
88 Id. at 2856.
89 Id. at 2856-59.
90 Justices Kennedy, White, Stevens, and Souter concurred with Scalia's disposition
of the facts in Part III(A).
91 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2858.
92 Id. at 2857.
93 433 U.S. 682 (1977); see also supra notes 26 and 38.
94 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2857. The elements of contempt are knowledge of a court
order by the defendant, and a willful violation of one of the conditions of the order. In
re Thompson, 454 A.2d 1324, 1326 (D.C. 1982).
95 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2857.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustices 0' Connor, Thomas, Blackmun and Kennedy
concurred with Justice Scalia's disposition of the facts in Part III(B).
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cutions each required proof of an element that the other did not.9 9
Specifically, the contempt charge required proof of knowledge of
the protective order, whereas the assault with intent to kill did not;
and the .assault with intent to kill required proof of specific intent,
which was not required under the contempt charge. 10 0 Similarly,
Justice Scalia concluded that the three criminal threat charges
against Foster were not barred by the Blockburger test, despite the
fact that Foster had been acquitted of this conduct at his contempt
trial, because the contempt charge and the criminal threat charge
each contained a distinct element. 10 A conviction for contempt re-
quired proof that Foster willfully violated the civil protection order,
but a conviction for criminally threatening his wife did not.10 2 Like-
wise, a conviction for criminal threatening specifically required that
the threat be one to kidnap, to inflict bodily injury, or to damage
property; however, a conviction for contempt only required proof
that Foster threatened his wife in "any manner."' 10 3
After concluding that the charges against Foster for assault with
intent to kill and threatening his wife were not barred by the Block-
burger test, the Court then had to determine, according to the Grady
decision, whether the government would have to prove the same
conduct for which Foster had already been tried. 10 4 Justice Scalia' 0 5
concluded that the prosecution would because the assault on May
21, 1988, and the threats that allegedly occurred on November 12,
1987, March 26, 1988, and May 17, 1988, were the basis of the con-
tempt proceeding and would likewise be the foundation for the
criminal proceedings. 10 6 Therefore, the prosecution for these of-
fenses would be barred by the Grady test.'0 7 Rather than accepting
this result, the majority decided to overrule Grady and re-adopt the
Blockburger rule as the exclusive test for determining the constitu-
tionality of subsequent prosecutions.10 8
The majority decided to overrule Grady because they believed
the decision "lack[ed] constitutional roots" and was an aberration in
99 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2858.
100 Id. at 2858-59.
101 Id. at 2859.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. The charge against Dixon and the simple assault charge against Foster were
not subjected to the Grady test because they were conclusively barred by the Blockburger
test. See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
105 ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Thomas joined Jus-
tice Scalia to form a majority.





the Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence. 10 9 However, rather
than setting forth detailed arguments to support this decision, Jus-
tice Scalia simply cited his own dissent in Grady"10 and countered
Justice Souter's dissenting argument"' that the Court has histori-
cally rejected the Blockburger rule as the exclusive test in double
jeopardy claims. 112 Justice Scalia specifically attacked Justice Sou-
ter's interpretation of four cases Souter offered as support for Grady,
asserting that Souter had either misconstrued the Court's holdings
in those cases or relied on mere dicta to support his position., l3
Justice Scalia first disputed Justice Souter's claim that In re Niel-
sen supported the Grady "same conduct" test." 4 Justice Souter ar-
gued the Nielsen Court had rejected a version of the "same
elements" test and focused instead on the conduct of the defend-
ant."15 However, Justice Scalia's opinion observed that the Nielsen
Court had simply applied a "common proposition, entirely in ac-
cord with [the 'same elements' test], that a prosecution for a greater
offense (cohabitation, defined to require proof of adultery) bars
prosecution for a lesser included offense (adultery)." ' 1 6 Further,
Justice Scalia cited two Supreme Court precedents as support for his
position that Nielsen rejected the "same conduct" test. 1 7 In both
cases the Court purported to follow the Nielsen decision, yet it per-
mitted subsequent prosecutions after applying only the "same ele-
ments" test."18  Justice Scalia argued that the cases were
109 Id. at 2860-64.
110 Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 526-44 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra
notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
111 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2881-91 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
see also infra notes 196-213 and accompanying text.
112 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2860.
113 Id. at 2860-62.
114 Id. at 2860.
115 Id. at 2885-86 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also infra
notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
116 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2860-61.
117 Id. at 2863 (citing Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911) and Burton v.
United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906)). Justice Souter interpreted these two cases more
narrowly. He conceded that in Gavieres the Court had applied only the Blockburger test in
determining whether a subsequent prosecution was permissible. However, Souter con-
tended that the Gavieres decision rested on an interpretation of a Philippine statute,
which the Court has never treated as an authoritative interpretation of the Fifth Amend-
ment. Id. at 2889 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Moreover,
Justice Souter noted that Burton came before the Court on a demurrer, so the Court was
not presented with the factual basis for the charge. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). ThusJustice Souter believed Burton stands for the narrow prop-
osition that "a claim of double jeopardy resting exclusively on pleadings cannot be adju-
dicated on any basis except the elements pleaded." Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
118 Id. at 2862.
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"incompatible with the belief' that Nielsen could be interpreted as
supporting the Grady "same conduct" test.119
Justice Scalia next disagreed withJustice Souter's interpretation
of Brown v. Ohio. 120 Justice Souter argued that Brown also supported
the Grady test, because the Court stated that the Blockburger test was
not the exclusive method for determining whether a successive
prosecution is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 12 1 Justice
Scalia responded by pointing out that this statement was made in a
footnote. Consequently, it was pure dicta and could not serve as
precedent.' 22 Justice Scalia further asserted that in Harris v.
Oklahoma, the Court had focused solely on the elements of the of-
fense, not the conduct of the defendants, as Justice Souter
claimed. 123
Lastly, Justice Scalia took issue with Justice Souter's position
that Illinois v. Vitale offered support for the Grady test. 124 Justice
Souter argued that the Vitale Court rejected the Blockburger test as
the exclusive mechanism for settling double jeopardy claims when it
stated that the defendant would have a "substantial" double jeop-
ardy claim if conduct for which he already had been prosecuted was
used as evidence in a subsequent trial.125 However, Justice Scalia
concluded that this statement was dicta that simply raised a question
rather than asserted a proposition.126 Consequently, it could not be
used as support for the proposition that the Court has traditionally
looked to the underlying conduct in double jeopardy cases. 127
The majority further asserted that Grady must be overturned
because it had proven unworkable in application. 128 Justice Scalia
cited the Court's decision in United States v. Felix,129 a case that
carved a large exception out of the Grady test soon after it was de-
cided, as support for this contention.13 0 In Felix, the Court allowed
a prosecution for conspiracy, despite the fact that at trial the govern-
ment proved conduct for which the defendant had been previously
11 Id.
120 Id. at 2861.
121 Id. at 2887 (Souter,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also infra notes
200-01 and accompanying text.
122 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2861.
123 Id.
124 Id. (citing Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980)).
125 Id. at 2887-88 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also infra
notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
126 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2862.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 2863.
129 United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992).
130 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2863.
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convicted, because there was "long-standing authority" that a pros-
ecution for the substantive offense did not preclude a subsequent
conviction for conspiracy. 131 For the majority, the need to carve
such a large exception out of Grady, so soon after it was decided,
created unnecessary confusion and raised the question of whether
that case was properly decided. 132
In sum, the majority viewed the Grady "same conduct" test as a
break with long-standing precedent that had proven unworkable in
application. The majority concluded that Grady "was a mistake" and
that upholding it would "mock" the principle of stare decisis.' 33
Therefore, the Court unequivocally overturned Grady and con-
cluded that the Blockburger "same elements" test was the sole test for
determining when a subsequent prosecution is barred by the
Double Jeopardy Clause.1M
B. CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S OPINION
Writing for two other members of the Court,' 35 Chief Justice
Rehnquist dissented from Part III(A) of Justice Scalia's opinion,
which held that the criminal drug charge against Dixon and the sim-
ple assault charge against Foster were barred by the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause. 136 In the Chief Justice's view, none of the criminal
charges brought against Dixon or Foster was barred by the Block-
burger test. 137 Rehnquist insisted that the Blockburger test only re-
quired the Court to examine the generic elements of contempt, 138
and the elements of the substantive offense, not the specific prohibi-
tions of the court order, to determine whether the criminal prosecu-
tion was permissible.139 Under this method of analysis, none of the
criminal prosecutions was barred because the elements of contempt
are distinct from the elements of the substantive offenses. 140 The
Chief Justice criticized Justice Scalia's conclusion, which relied on
Harris, that the court order incorporated the elements of possession
with intent to distribute and assault into the elements of con-
131 Id. (citing Felix, 112 S. Ct. at 1384-85).
132 Id.
133 Id. at 2864.
134 Id.
135 Justice 0' Connor and Justice Thomas joined the ChiefJustice's opinion.
136 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2865 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
137 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
138 See supra note 94.
139 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2867 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
140 Id. at 2866-67 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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tempt.141 According to Rehnquist, robbery with a firearm was only
precluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause because the felony mur-
der statute at issue in that case included proof of a felony as one of
its elements. 142 Consequently, the elements of armed robbery were
necessary to prove felony murder.143 In contrast, the elements of
contempt did not require proof of a crime; therefore, Chief Justice
Rehnquist concluded, Harris cannot be read to require an incorpo-
ration of the substantive criminal offense into the elements for con-
tempt. In Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion, this conclusion
accorded with decisions of every federal appeals court and state
supreme court to consider the question.144
Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist insisted that Justice Scalia's
argument that possession of cocaine and assault were lesser in-
cluded offenses of contempt was intuitively illogical: contempt is a
relatively minor offense, not an aggravated form of possession of
cocaine or assault, which are two serious felonies. 145 Additionally,
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that a lesser included offense is one
that is by definition "necessarily included" within the statutory ele-
ments of another offense.' 46 Because a defendant could be found
guilty of contempt without satisfying the elements of the substantive
crimes of possession of cocaine or assault, the criminal offenses can-
not be considered lesser included offenses of contempt.147
In sum, Chief Justice Rehnquist believed that none of the of-
fenses against Dixon and Foster were barred by the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause because the elements of contempt were distinct from
those of the underlying offenses. Moreover, the Chief Justice be-
lieved Justice Scalia's conclusion that the possession of cocaine
charge against Dixon and the simple assault charge against Foster
141 Id. at 2867 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
142 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
143 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
144 Id. at 2866 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Han-
sen v. United States, 1 F.2d 316, 317 (7th Cir. 1924) (holding that contempt of court for
violating a court order "bears no necessary relation to liability for violating a criminal
statute, although both are incurred by the same act"); Orban v. United States, 18 F.2d
374, 375 (6th Cir. 1927) (ruling that a contempt proceeding does not preclude a subse-
quent criminal prosecution for the same conduct); Commonwealth v. Allen, 486 A.2d
363, 368-71 (Pa. 1984) (holding that a "prosecution on [a] substantive criminal charge
after a finding of contempt in violation of [a court order] does not violate double jeop-
ardy"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 842 (1985); People v. Totten, 514 N.E.2d 959, 963-65 (Ill.
1987) (holding that a criminal prosecution for aggravated battery is not precluded by a
previous contempt prosecution for the same conduct)).
145 Id. at 2868 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
146 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
147 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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were lesser included offenses of contempt defied logic and was con-
trary to the definition of a lesser included offense.
C. JUSTICE WHITE'S OPINION
Justice White agreed with the majority's decision that the Block-
burger test mandated that the drug charge against Dixon and the sim-
ple assault charge against Foster be dismissed.1 48 However, he
dissented from Part III(B) of Justice Scalia's opinion, which held
that the Blockburger test did not bar the prosecution of Foster for
assault with intent to kill and for threatening his wife. 149 Justice
White believed that the Blockburger test barred both of these charges
because "the offenses at issue were either identical to, or lesser in-
cluded offenses of, those charged in the subsequent prosecu-
tions." 150  Because Justice White believed the Blockburger test
disposed of all the charges against Dixon and Foster, he concluded
that there was no need for the Court even to address the Grady deci-
sion. He therefore dissented from the majority's decision to over-
turn it. 151
Before coming to these conclusions, Justice White felt it was
first necessary to systematically refute the government's arguments
that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the criminal prosecu-
tions of Dixon and Foster. 152 First, the government had alleged that
the Double Jeopardy Clause was inapplicable to nonsummary con-
tempt proceedings and had cited three Supreme Court decisions, In
re Debs,153 In re Chapman,154 andJurney v. MacCracken,155 to support
this contention. 156 Justice White, however, pointed out that because
the relevant portion of In re Debs had been effectively reversed by the
Court's decision in Bloom v. Illinois,157 it offered no support for the
148 Id. at 2868-89 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
149 Id. at 2869 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
150 Id. at 2874 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
151 Id. at 2869 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
152 Id. at 2869-74 (White, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia
declined to thoroughly refute the government's arguments because he felt that "it [is]
unnecessary, and indeed undesirable, to address at any greater length than we have
arguments based on dictum and inapplicable doctrines." Id. at 2858 n.4.
153 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (ruling that certain contempt proceedings were exempt from
providing defendants with constitutional protections).
154 166 U.S. 661 (1897) (ruling that a witness who refuses to testify before Congress is
subject to contempt charges).
155 294 U.S. 125 (1955) (ruling that Congress has the power to bring contempt pro-
ceedings against and punish witnesses who refuse to testify).
156 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2869 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
157 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (ruling that defendants have the right to a jury trial in all
criminal proceedings).
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government's position.15 8 Moreover, Justice White noted that both
In re Chapman andJurney involved summary contempt proceedings,
in which courts' powers are not subject to constitutional restraints,
and consequently were not controlling in decisions regarding non-
summary proceedings. 159 Therefore, Justice White concluded that
the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to nonsummary contempt
proceedings. 160
Next, the government had argued that the contempt charges
and the substantive criminal charges were distinct offenses because
they protect different interests: contempt preserves the courts' au-
thority, while criminal statues protect the public's safety.' 6' Justice
White, however, argued that while the offenses may protect distinct
interests, this is simply an indicia of legislative intent and conse-
quently should only be considered in determining the constitution-
ality of multiple punishments for the "same" offense. Since Dixon
was a successive prosecution case, the defendant's interest in being
protected from multiple trials is primary and would override both
the interests of the court and the criminal justice system. 162
The government and amici both had asserted that applying the
DoubleJeopardy Clause to contempt proceedings would undermine
judicial authority. Courts, they feared, would be unwilling to en-
force their orders out of concern that enforcement would preempt
the possibility of a subsequent criminal trial for the underlying of-
fense and thus allow criminals to escape serious punishment. 163
Justice White dismissed this argument by explaining that courts pos-
sess alternative powers, such as revocation of bail, which would en-
158 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2869 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159 Id. (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia agreed with
this reasoning and conclusion. Id. at 2857.
160 Id. at 2870 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
161 Id. (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Justice Blackmun ac-
cepted this argument in his opinion. Id. at 2880 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see also infra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
162 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2871 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice White acknowledged that the doctrine of dual sovereignty, which allows succes-
sive prosecutions for the same offense if the governmental entities that bring the charges
derive their punitive authority from distinct sources, subordinates the defendant's rights
to the government's interest in prosecuting criminals. However, he concluded that
Dixon did not implicate dual sovereignty because the courts in this case derived their
authority to punish contempt and statutory offenses from the same entity-Congress.
Id. at 2870-71 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
163 Id. at 2872 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun
agreed with this position. Id. at 2880 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also infra note 184 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia, however, believed it
was inappropriate to determine whether the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to a situa-
tion depending on its practical considerations and, therefore, declined to address these
issues in his opinion. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2858 n.4.
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able them to preserve their authority without exposing future
prosecutions to a possible Double Jeopardy bar. 164 Moreover, Jus-
tice White noted that prosecutors could elect to try the contempt
and the criminal charge in the same proceeding, 165 thus avoiding
the possibility of double jeopardy and preserving the interests of
both the courts and the criminal justice system. 166
After dismissing the government's arguments that the Double
Jeopardy Clause did not apply to the contempt proceedings in
Dixon, Justice White argued that all the charges against Dixon and
Foster were barred by the Blockburger test. 167 Justice White reasoned
that the court orders merely "triggered the court's authority to pun-
ish the defendant[s] for acts already punishable under criminal
laws."168 Therefore, he "put aside" the court orders and compared
the elements of the substantive offenses charged in the contempt
and the criminal prosecutions. 169 This method of analysis led Jus-
tice White to conclude that the offenses charged in the criminal in-
dictments were either identical to, or the aggravated forms of, the
offenses prosecuted in the contempt proceeding and thus were pre-
cluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 170
Justice White admitted that comparing the elements of con-
tempt to the elements of the offenses charged in a criminal indict-
ment, as Justice Scalia did, may be appropriate in multiple
punishment cases. However, he believed a strict Blockburger analysis
was inadequate in cases involving successive prosecutions. 171 Spe-
cifically, Justice White believed that allowing the prosecution of Fos-
ter for both the assault and the threat charges would subject him to
the dangers of double jeopardy because he would be faced with the
164 Id. at 2872 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165 Justice White conceded that victims of domestic violence often rely upon the
speed of a contempt proceeding to protect them from their abuser but asserted that the
interests of the victim could be protected by arresting the offender for violation of the
protection order and holding him without bail. Thus, there would be no need for an
immediate contempt proceeding which could preclude a subsequent criminal trial. Id. at
2874 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
166 Id. at 2873 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice White
cited the facts of Dixon's case as support for this conclusion. The same prosecutor who
requested the court to hold Dixon in contempt was also responsible for trying the co-
caine charge; thus, there would have been no difficulty in coordinating the two prosecu-
tions. Id. (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
167 Id. at 2874-76 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
168 Id. at 2876 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
169 Id. (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
170 Id. at 2875 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
171 Id. at 2876 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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"embarrassment" and "expense" of numerous trials.1 72 Moreover,
regarding the threat counts, Foster would face the increased chance
of an erroneous conviction because, even though he previously had
been acquitted of these offenses, another trial would give the gov-
ernment an opportunity to "fine-tun[e]" its prosecution to obtain a
conviction. 1 73
Finally, Justice White argued that a strict application of the
Blockburger test causes "illogical" and "harmful" consequences in
successive prosecution cases. 174 According to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, a defendant charged with an aggravated form
of an offense, such as assault with intent to kill, may be convicted of
the lesser included offense, such as simple assault, even if he was not
specifically charged with the lesser offense because at trial the jury is
required to return a verdict on all lesser included offenses.1 75
Therefore, if the government could bring charges against Foster for
assault with intent to kill, it could obtain a conviction against Foster
for simple assault, despite the fact that the Double Jeopardy Clause
prevented it from charging him with simple assault.1 76 Justice
White argued that this result was both "unjustifiable" and "perni-
cious" and reasoned that since the government could not constitu-
tionally charge Foster with simple assault, neither should it be able
to charge him with assault with intent to kill. 177 Because Justice
White believed that the Blockburger test disposed of all the charges,
he argued that the "same conduct" test should not even be an issue
in the case and dissented from the majority's decision to overturn
Grady.178
D. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S OPINION
Justice Blackmun concurred with the majority's decision that
the Double Jeopardy Clause did not preclude the assault with intent
to kill charge and the threat charges against Foster. 179 However, he
dissented from the majority's decision that the Double Jeopardy
172 Id. at 2877 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957)).
173 Id. (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Tibbs v. Florida,
457 U.S. 31 (1982); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978)).
174 Id. (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
175 Id. (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P.
31(c)).
176 Id. at 2878 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia
disputed this conclusion, arguing that under Blockburger, "Foster may neither be tried a
second time ... nor again convicted for assault." Id. at 2859 n.7.
177 Id. at 2878 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
178 Id. (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
179 Id. at 2879 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Clause mandated that the charge against Dixon and the simple as-
sault charge against Foster be dismissed.180 Justice Blackmun
reached these conclusions by reasoning that since the contempt
charges and the criminal charges protect distinct interests, they
were not the "same."' 81 Thus, he concluded, the criminal prosecu-
tion of Dixon and Foster did not constitute double jeopardy. Justice
Blackmun cited the Court's ruling in Young v. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils,
S.A.,1 8 2 which stated the sole purpose of contempt proceedings is to
vindicate the authority of the courts, not to punish criminal of-
fenses.' 83 Moreover, Justice Blackmun argued that because con-
tempt is one of the only mechanisms courts have to vindicate their
authority, the Court's "willingness to overlook the unique interests
served by contempt proceedings . . . will undermine [the courts']
ability to respond effectively to unmistakable threats to their own
authority and those who have sought the [courts'] protection."' 84
E. JUSTICE SOUTER'S OPINION
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred with the
majority's conclusion that the charges against Dixon and the assault
charge against Foster were barred.' 85 However, he dissented from
the majority's conclusion with respect to the charges against Foster
for assault with intent to kill and for threatening his wife because
Justice Souter believed those charges were precluded by the Court's
decision in Grady.186 Moreover, Justice Souter dissented from the
Court's decision to overturn Grady because, in his view, it was well
grounded in the Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence and pro-
vided defendants with protection from the dangers associated with
subsequent prosecutions. 187
Justice Souter began his analysis with an overview of the inter-
ests the Double Jeopardy Clause was designed to serve. He con-
cluded that the Clause serves disparate interests in multiple
punishment and successive prosecutions cases. 188 In multiple pun-
180 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
181 Id. at 2880 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
182 481 U.S. 787 (1987) (holding that while district courts have the power to appoint a
private attorney to prosecute criminal contempt charges, they should refrain from ap-
pointing a private prosecutor until the appropriate prosecuting authority declines the
court's request to prosecute).
183 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2880 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
184 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
185 Id. at 2890 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
186 Id. at 2881 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
187 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
188 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ishment cases, the DoubleJeopardy Clause ensures that a defendant
does not receive more punishment than is legislatively author-
ized.' 8 9 Thus, in ruling on a claim of multiple punishment, courts
should examine the elements of the two offenses, as defined by the
legislature, to determine whether the legislature intended to impose
multiple punishments for offenses arising out of the same con-
duct.1 90 Because the Blockburger test focuses on the elements of the
offenses charged, Justice Souter advocated it as the appropriate test
for this determination.' 9 1
In successive prosecution cases, however, the Double Jeopardy
Clause precludes the government from " 'mak[ing] repeated at-
tempts to convict an individual.., thereby subjecting him to embar-
rassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity.' 192 Moreover, the
Clause reduces the possibility of an erroneous conviction because it
prevents the government from perfecting its trial presentation and
strategy during numerous prosecutions. 93 Justice Souter argued
that an examination of the elements of the offenses charged in suc-
cessive prosecution cases, as the Blockburger test requires, is inade-
quate because theoretically "the government could manipulate the
definitions of offenses, creating fine distinctions among them and
permitting a zealous prosecutor to try a person again and again for
essentially the same criminal conduct."' 94 Justice Souter main-
tained that the Double Jeopardy Clause is "not so fragile that it can
be avoided by finely drafted statutes and carefully planned
prosecutions." 95
Justice Souter believed that a line of cases beginning with In re
Nielsen demonstrates the Court's consistent recognition of the inade-
quacy of Blockburger and its willingness to look to the defendant's
conduct in ruling on successive prosecution cases.' 96 Quoting the
Nielsen Court's language that when "a person has been tried and
189 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
190 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
191 Id. at 2882 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
192 Id. at 2883 (SouterJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957)).
193 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Tibbs v. Florida,
457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982)).
194 Id. (Souter,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia argued that
this danger is unrealistic because of Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 435 (1970), in which the
Court held that factual issues determined in favor of a defendant cannot be relitigated in
a subsequent trial. Moreover, conflicting demands on the government's resources and
time may prevent numerous attempts at conviction. Id. at 2863-64 n.14.
195 Id. at 2890 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
196 Id at 2884 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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convicted for a crime which has various incidents included in it, he
cannot be a second time tried for one of those incidents without
being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense," Justice Souter
contended that the Court barred the adultery charge because it re-
quired proof of the same conduct as cohabitation, not because it was
a lesser included offense of cohabitation, as Justice Scalia main-
tained.19 7 Moreover, Justice Souter pointed out that adultery could
not be a lesser included offense of cohabitation because it required
proof of marriage, whereas cohabitation did not. By choosing to
focus on the conduct rather than on the elements of the offense,
Justice Souter argued that the Nielsen Court effectively rejected the
use of the "same elements" test in successive prosecution cases.198
Justice Souter further insisted that the modern Court's subse-
quent prosecution jurisprudence recognizes the inadequacy of the
Blockburger test and examines the underlying conduct in ruling on
double jeopardy claims.' 99 As proof for this contention, he cited a
footnote in Brown v. Ohio for the proposition that " '[tihe Blockburger
test is not the only standard for determining whether successive
prosecutions impermissibly involve the same offense.' ",200 Because
the Court cited Nielsen for this proposition, Justice Souter reasoned
that the Brown Court had interpreted Nielsen as supporting the
"same conduct" test. ThusJustice Souter concluded, Grady has his-
torical foundations. 20 1
Justice Souter found additional support in Harris v. Oklahoma.202
In Harris, the Court concluded that a prosecution for armed robbery
was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause because the defendant
previously had been prosecuted for the greater offense, felony mur-
der, in connection with the same robbery. 20 3 ForJustice Souter, the
Court's analysis "turned on considering the prior conviction in
terms of the conduct actually charged," rather than focusing on the
elements of the crimes. 204 In his view, if the Court had strictly ap-
plied the Blockburger test, the subsequent prosecution for robbery
197 Id. at 2885-86 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting In re
Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 188 (1889)). Justice Scalia disputed this interpretation of the
passage, arguing that the context and the literal definition of the word "incident" indi-
cate that the Court was focusing on the elements of the crimes, not the conduct. Id. at
2861 n.10.
198 Id. at 2886 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
199 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
200 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Brown v. Ohio,
432 U.S. 161, 166 n.6 (1977).
201 Id. at 2887 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
202 433 U.S. 682 (1977).
203 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2887 (Souter,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
204 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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with a firearm would have been permitted because felony murder
required proof of a killing and armed robbery did not; likewise, rob-
bery with a firearm required proof of a use of a gun, and felony
murder did not.20 5 Thus, Justice Souter interpreted Harris as "fol-
low[ing] the holding in Nielsen and conform[ing] to the statement...
in Brown, that the Blockburger test is not the exclusive standard for
determining whether the rule against successive prosecutions ap-
plies in a given case." 20 6
Justice Souter found further support for his interpretation of
Nielsen in Illinois v. Vitale.207 In deciding to remand, the Vitale Court
noted that if the government must prove that the defendant failed to
slow in order to obtain a conviction for manslaughter, the defendant
would have a "substantial" double jeopardy claim since he had al-
ready been tried for that conduct.208 Because the Court cited Harris
for this proposition, Justice Souter argued that the Court must have
interpreted Harris to mean that "when one has already been tried
for a crime comprising certain conduct, a subsequent prosecution
seeking to prove the same conduct is barred by the DoubleJeopardy
Clause. '20 9 Therefore, Justice Souter contended that in the twenti-
eth century the Court has repeatedly looked to the underlying con-
duct in determining whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a
subsequent prosecution.210
Finally, Justice Souter asserted that, even if the precedents were
inconclusive, the question was settled in Grady. In Grady, the Court
unequivocally held that "the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a subse-
quent prosecution if, to establish an essential element of an offense
charged in that prosecution, the government will prove conduct that
constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been
prosecuted. ' 21 1 Moreover, Justice Souter could find no justifica-
tion for the majority's decision to overturn Grady.212 In his view, the
cases the majority cited as proof that Grady was unworkable in appli-
cation offered inadequate justification to upset the principle of stare
205 Id. (SouterJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia argued that
Harris does not offer support for the "same conduct" test because the Court's analysis
focused on the elements of the offenses and did not even discuss the defendant's con-
duct. Id. at 2861.
206 Id. at 2887 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
207 Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1987).
208 Id at 420.
209 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2888 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
210 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
211 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Grady v. Corbin,
495 U.S. 508, 510 (1990)).
212 Id. at 2889 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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decisis. Thus, he dissented from the decision to overturn Grady.213
After arguing that Grady was a sound decision, Justice Souter
applied the Grady test to facts of Dixon. Justice Souter argued that an
exclusive application of the Blockburger test would allow a criminal
prosecution of Dixon for the drug charge because contempt and
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute technically contain
different elements.2 14 However, under Grady the criminal prosecu-
tion would be precluded because Dixon had already been prose-
cuted for this conduct.2 1 5 Similarly, Justice Souter concluded that
the prosecution of Foster for simple assault would be barred be-
cause he had already been convicted of this charge. In regard to the
charges against Foster for assault with intent to kill and for threaten-
ing his wife on three separate occasions, Justice Souter argued that
while they may be permissible under the Blockburger test, they were
barred by Grady because they were based on the same conduct for
which Foster had already been tried in the contempt proceeding.2 16
Justice Souter concluded by arguing that the Grady "same con-
duct" test has roots dating to the late 1800s.217 Thus, Souter rea-
soned that the Court could not eliminate the "same conduct" test
"from our constitutional jurisprudence" simply by overturning
Grady. In addition, the court must overrule a number of cases, in-
cluding Nielsen, Harris, and Vitale.2 18 Because Justice Souter refused
to do that, he would have upheld the decision of the court of
appeals.219
V. ANALYSIS
This Note argues that Justice Scalia and Justice Souter's debate
over whether the Blockburger test or the Grady test best articulates the
Court's historical double jeopardy jurisprudence is an exercise in
futility. Rather than focusing on historical applications of the
clause, the Court should clearly identify the interests that the Clause
is intended to protect and develop a test that best protects those
213 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Souter opined
that the Grady "rule is straightforward, and a departure from it is not justified by the fact
that two Court of Appeals decisions have described it as difficult to apply." Id. (Souter,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
214 Id. at 2890 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In reaching this
conclusion, Justice Souter used analysis similar to that of Chief Justice Rehnquist. See
supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
215 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2890 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
216 Id. at 2891 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
217 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
218 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
219 Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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interests in the context of today's society and criminal justice
system.220
A. THE IRRELEVANCE OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE'S HISTORY
The Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence "can hardly be
characterized as [a] model[] of consistency and clarity." 221 This in-
consistency and confusion is caused by the Court's repeated at-
tempts to ensure that its holdings comport with the history of the
clause.222 A historical approach to double jeopardy analysis is mis-
placed for three reasons: the definitional nature of crimes has sub-
stantially changed over time, the criminal justice system has
changed over time, and the framers' intent behind the clause is am-
biguous. Under English and early American common law, the
number of offenses for which a defendant could be charged was ex-
tremely limited, 223 and the offenses were broad in scope.224 Today,
however, there are countless offenses distinguishable only by fine
nuances. Therefore, a modem prosecutor could prosecute a de-
fendant repeatedly simply by making minor alterations to the crimi-
nal charges each time.2 25 Moreover, at common law the conviction
rate was extremely high and most convicted felons were either de-
ported or executed. Thus, defendants were rarely prosecuted twice
for the same offense. 226
Additionally, the power of the prosecutor has changed over
time.22 7 At common law, the prosecutor was restrained by very for-
220 See Monroe G. McKay, Double Jeopardy: Are the Pieces the Puzzle?, 23 WASHBURN LJ. 1
(1983). The Court has used this approach in interpreting other Amendments, most no-
tably the First Amendment. Id. at 16.
221 Burkes v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 9 (1978); see also In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176
(1889) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause is violated when a defendant is tried
twice for the same conduct); Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911) (holding
that the DoubleJeopardy Clause is not violated even if the two charges are based on the
same conduct if the two offenses charged have different statutory elements); Grady v.
Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990) (holding that courts must look to both the elements of the
offenses and the defendant's conduct to determine whether the DoubleJeopardy Clause
is violated by a subsequent prosecution).
222 McKay, supra note 220, at 11-12.
223 At the time the Bill of Rights was ratified there were only 160 offenses. Note,
Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life for a Moribund Constitutional
Guarantee, 65 YALE LJ. 339, 342 n.14 (1956) [hereinafter Statutory Implementation].
224 Id. See also Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE LJ. 262, 279 (1965) [hereinafter Twice
in Jeopardy]; McKay, supra note 220, at 14.
225 Thomas, supra note 15, at 396.
226 Statutory Implementation, supra note 223, at 342; Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 224, at
279.
227 See JAY A. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL
POLICY 169 (1969).
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
malistic procedural rules. 228 For instance, if there was any disparity
between the facts set forth in the indictment and the evidence
presented at trial, the case was dismissed.229 The prosecutor also
was not allowed to amend the indictment. 230 The purpose of these
rules was to prevent "arbitrary multiplications of offenses and ex-
tension of the criminal law." 231 Today, these formalities are gone,
and prosecutors are given broad discretion in prosecuting defend-
ants. 23 2 Consequently, the DoubleJeopardy Clause has great signif-
icance in today's society because it is one of the only limitations on
the prosecutor's power.23 3 Because the definitional structure of
crimes and the power of the prosecutor has changed over time, any
definition of when two offenses are the same that comports with his-
torical interpretations of the Clause will not adequately protect de-
fendants from double jeopardy in the modern criminal justice
system.
Moreover, the legislative history of the Double Jeopardy Clause
does not provide any indication of what the Framers meant by the
phrase "same offense. ' 234 In ratifying the clause, the First Congress
seemingly intended to adopt an ancient principle of justice that no
person should be tried twice for the same offense. 23 5 Consequently,
Congress did not specifically delineate what factors should be ex-
amined in determining whether two offenses are the "same. ' 23 6 Be-
cause the Framers envisioned the prohibition against double
jeopardy as a conceptual restraint on government, any attempt to
formulate a rigid, mechanical test that comports with the Framers'
intent is futile. For the above stated reasons, the common law his-
tory of the Double Jeopardy Clause is irrelevant in formulating a
test which best protects a defendant from double jeopardy in the
context of the modern criminal justice system.237
228 Id. at 170-71; McKay, supra note 220, at 14.
229 McKay, supra note 220, at 14.
230 SIGLER, supra note 227, at 170.
231 McKay, supra note 220, at 15 (citing 1 L. RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF THE ENG-
LISH CRIMINAL LAW 102 n.72 (1948) (quotingJ. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAw OF ENGLAND 293 (1883)).
232 SIGLER, supra note 227, at 170-71.
233 Id. at 171.
234 Id. at 27-34.
235 Id. at 1-37.
236 Id. at 32.
237 The Court itself has previously indicated that the history of the Clause in not "dis-
positive in DoubleJeopardy Claims." Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 517 n.8 (1990).
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B. INTERESTS THAT THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE WAS INTENDED
TO PROTECT
Like other protections delineated in the Bill of Rights, the
Double Jeopardy Clause was designed to protect individuals from
governmental tyranny.238 The clause accomplishes this goal by en-
suring the finality of judicial determinations regarding the individ-
ual's guilt or innocence. 239 By guaranteeing finality, the clause
provides defendants with numerous protections. First, the clause
prevents the government from harassing individuals by ensuring
that "the State with all its resources and power [does not] make re-
peated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecu-
rity." 240 Second, by assuring the finality ofjudicial determinations,
the clause minimizes the chances that a defendant will be wrongly
convicted upon retrial.2 41 If a defendant is prosecuted numerous
times for the same offense, the prosecution is given the opportunity
to perfect its presentation of evidence and trial strategies, thus in-
creasing the risk of an erroneous conviction. 242 Moreover, repeated
prosecutions wear down the defendant and consume his resources,
which likewise increase the chances for a wrongful conviction. 243
238 See Ohio v.Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498-99 (1984); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,
456 (1970); McKay, supra note 220, at 15; George C. Thomas III, An Elegant Theory of
Double Jeopardy, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 827, 832-33.
239 See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 795 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Johnson, 467 U.S. at 498-99; United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128, 136 (1980);
United States v.Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971). See also Peter Westen & Richard Drubel,
Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. CT. REv. 81, 84.
240 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). See also Note, Consecutive
Sentences in Single Prosecutions: Judicial Multiplication of Statutory Penalties, 67 YALE L.J. 916,
918 (1957) [hereinafter Consecutive Sentences]; Note, The Double Jeopardy Clause as a Bar to
Reintroducing Evidence, 89 YALE L.J. 962, 964 (1980) [hereinafter Double Jeopardy Bar].
241 MARTIN L. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 4 (1969).
242 See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982) (noting that the Double Jeopardy
Clause "prevents the State from honing its trial strategies and perfecting its evidence
through successive attempts at conviction); accord Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 518
(1990); Green, 355 U.S. at 187. See also Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970) (the
State admitted in its brief that upon retrial the prosecutor did "what every good attorney
would do-he refined his presentation in light of the turn of events at the first trial");
Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958) (after obtaining an acquittal, the prosecution
altered its trial strategy and obtained a conviction in the subsequent proceedings); Twice
in Jeopardy, supra note 224, at 278 (noting that without a guarantee of finality a defendant
could be acquitted by numerous juries until the prosecutor convinced one jury to
convict).
243 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (noting that there can be no equal
justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has); see
also Donald Eric Burton, A Closer Look at the Supreme Court and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 779, 804 (1988) (noting that the imbalance in resources between the pros-
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Because the Double Jeopardy Clause embodies the concept that fi-
nality protects defendants from governmental tyranny, the Court
should focus on this interest in developing a test for double jeop-
ardy rather than looking to the vague confines of history, as Justice
Scalia did, or the Court's inconclusive double jeopardy jurispru-
dence, as Justice Souter did. 244
C. FAILURE OF THE BLOCKBURGER AND THE GRADY TESTS TO
ADEQUATELY PROTECT THE INTERESTS THE DOUBLE
JEOPARDY CLAUSE WAS INTENDED TO PROTECT
This Note argues that neither the Blockburger test nor the Grady
test adequately insures finality; thus, they fail to protect the interests
the Double Jeopardy Clause was designed to serve. The Blockburger
test's focus on the elements of the offenses charged is inadequate
due to the immense number, and overlapping nature, of offenses
with which a defendant can be charged.245 It is conceivable that a
prosecutor would divide up a crime in such a way that a defendant
could be tried numerous times for the same conduct. 246 In such a
scenario, a defendant would be exposed to governmental harass-
ment and the possibility of wrongful conviction. 247
Further, the Blockburger test is inadequate because it was devel-
oped to protect an individual from receiving multiple punishments
for the same offense, not to prevent vexatious successive prosecu-
ecution and the defense is so great that a defendant will not receive a fair trial if he is
subject to numerous prosecutions).
244 McKay, supra note 220, at 15.
245 See United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2848, 2888 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); see also Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 446 n.10 (1970);
Thomas, supra note 238, at 98; Statutory Implementation, supra note 223, at 222; Note,
Double Jeopardy and the Multiple Count Indictment, 57 YALE L.J. 132, 133 (1947).
246 Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2883 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Consecutive Sentences, supra note 240, at 928 n.43 (noting that a single sale of narcotics
could theoretically result in nine distinct prosecutions: (1) purchase of narcotics from
an unstamped package; (2) selling narcotics from an unstamped package; (3) dispensing
narcotics from an unstamped package; (4) sale of narcotics without a written order form;
(5) buying illegally imported narcotics; (6) receiving illegally imported narcotics; (7)
concealing illegally imported narcotics; (8) facilitating the transportation of illegally im-
ported narcotics; (9) selling illegally imported narcotics). See also Grady v. Corbin, 495
U.S. 508, 520 (1990) (noting that if only the Blockburger test were applied to the facts of
the case, the defendant could be tried four separate times for one criminal act); Ashe, 397
U.S. at 452 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that a prosecutor could bring numerous
charges if the offense affected several victims, if the criminal action could be divided into
chronologically discrete crimes, or if it was illegal under numerous different statutes).
247 Eli J. Richardson, Matching Tests for Double Jeopardy Violations with Constitutional Inter-
ests, 45 VAND. L. REv. 273, 275 (1992); Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 224, at 274. See also
Grady, 495 U.S at 520.
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tions. 248 George C. Thomas argues that the most important pur-
pose of the clause is to protect the innocent from wrongful
conviction.249 Because "[t]he existence of a single conviction repre-
sents ajudgment that the defendant is guilty," the imposition of ad-
ditional punishment imposes no additional risk that an innocent
person will be wrongly convicted. 250 Conversely, a second trial after
an initial acquittal increases the chance that the government, with all
its power and resources, will be able to obtain a guilty verdict
against an innocent defendant.251 For these reasons, Thomas ar-
gues that the protection against multiple prosecution is more funda-
mental to protecting the innocent than the protection against
multiple punishments. 252 Therefore, "it is incongruous to use a test
developed to measure the scope of a less fundamental protection
as the sole measure of the protection against successive
prosecutions." 2 53
Moreover, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the Block-
burger test is simply a mechanism for determining legislative in-
tent.254  Discerning legislative intent in successive prosecution
cases is irrelevant because a legislature could narrowly define of-
fenses, which would allow a prosecutor to unconstitutionally bring
numerous prosecutions against a defendant for what in essence is
the same offense against society.255 Because multiple prosecutions
for the same offense are unconstitutional regardless of the legisla-
ture's intent, the Blockburger test is inapplicable in successive prose-
cution cases. 256 In sum, the Blockburger test cannot adequately
protect a defendant from being prosecuted twice for the same of-
fense, as it "was neither designed nor developed for this purpose
and is theoretically inappropriate for the task." 2 57
While the Court in Grady considered the interests protected by
the Double Jeopardy Clause and attempted to formulate a test that
adequately protected those interests, 258 this Note argues that the
248 Thomas, supra note 15, at 371-72.
249 Id. at 341-42.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Id at 372.
253 Id.
254 See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340 (1981) (stating "[t]he Blockburger
test is a 'rule of statutory construction' "); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 711
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting the Blockburger test is simply a mechanism for
determining legislative intent).
255 Thomas, supra note 15, at 372.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 518-19 (1990).
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"same conduct" test fails to ensure finality and thus inadequately
protects individuals from unconstitutional successive prosecutions.
The major deficiency of the Grady test lies in its vagueness. In hand-
ing down this test, the Court failed to delineate exactly when and
how a prosecutor proves "conduct for which a defendant has al-
ready been charged." 259 Therefore, "[lt is not at all apparent how
a court is to go about deciding whether the evidence that has been
introduced (or that will be introduced) at the second trial 'proves
conduct' that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has al-
ready been prosecuted. ' 260 The lack of guidance in applying the
test resulted in inconsistent and unclear decisions. 261 This Note ar-
gues that the Grady test does not protect the interests of finality be-
cause it enables a prosecutor to subject a defendant to at least the
initial stages of numerous prosecutions in which the government
will attempt to bring a second prosecution by fitting its case into one
of the exceptions to the Grady decision.
In most circumstances a defendant does not know exactly what
conduct the prosecution is going to prove at trial until the trial com-
mences. Therefore, a determination of whether a successive prose-
cution violates the Grady test can never be made until the defendant
has been forced to undergo the initial stages of a potentially uncon-
stitutional trial.262 While Grady may ensure that a defendant is not
twice convicted for the same offense, it does not guarantee that a
defendant will not be subjected to the embarrassment, expense and
ordeal of the initial stages of a second prosecution until the court
can make a double jeopardy determination. As a result, it does not
259 Id. at 541 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
260 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
261 See, e.g., United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992) (creating a large
exception to Grady by ruling that prosecution for conspiracy is not precluded by a prose-
cution for an underlying offense); Sharpton v. Turner, 964 F.2d 1284, 1287 (2d Cir.
1992) (noting that the Grady test "has proven difficult to apply"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1665 (1992); Lander v. Smith, 941 F.2d 356, 364 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that "even if
[Grady is] carefully analyzed and painstakingly administered, [it] is not easy to apply");
United States v. Calderone, 917 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1990) (issuing three separate opinions
as to how to apply Grady), vacated and remanded, 112 S. Ct. 1657 (1992); United States v.
Exposito, 912 F.2d 60, 65 (3d Cir. 1990) (creating an exception to Grady by ruling that
prior RICO prosecution does not preclude a subsequent prosecution for a predicate
offense), cert. dismissed, 498 U.S. 1075 (1991); Eatherton v. State, 810 P.2d 93, 99 (Wyo.
1991) (the majority argued that the Grady Court "didn't really develop any new law"
regarding successive prosecutions, while the dissent argued that Grady required a rever-
sal of the conviction). Thomas also noted that the Grady test will create uncertainty.
Thomas, supra note 15, at 387.
262 Grady, 495 U.S. at 529-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that because a defendant
has no right to be informed of the evidence the prosecution will present at trial, in most




provide an appropriate level of protection from governmental
harassment.263
D. THE SAME TRANSACTION TEST
As explained above, neither the "same elements" test nor the
"same conduct" test adequately serves the interests the Double
Jeopardy Clause is designed to protect. Therefore, this Note argues
that the Court should abandon both of these tests and adopt the
"same transaction" test, a test better suited to provide defendants
with the requisite protections against double jeopardy. The "same
transaction" test requires "the prosecution, except in the most lim-
ited circumstances, to join at one trial all the charges against a de-
fendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode,
or transaction." 264
This test offers numerous advantages. The finality of a judicial
determination would be guaranteed because a prosecutor would not
be able to bring additional charges arising out of the same transac-
tion in a subsequent proceeding. 265 Therefore, the government
could not harass an individual through repeated prosecutions. This
263 Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 224, at 275 ("Since a major purpose of the double
jeopardy prohibition is to preclude vexatious reprosecution, it is senseless to compel a
defendant to undergo the second trial in order to determine whether it is barred.").
264 Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). The
limited exception to this test would permit subsequent prosecutions when: (1) the prose-
cution is unable to bring charges against a defendant at the initial trial because facts
necessary to establish that charge have not been discovered despite the prosecutor's
diligent efforts; (2) a defendant pleaded guilty or nolo contendre to a lesser charge that
occurred in the transaction; (3) courts, due to their limited jurisdiction, are unable to try
all the charges together; (4) joinder would be prejudicial to either the defense or the
prosecution. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 n.7 (1977) (stating that an exception
to the rule that a prosecution for a greater offense is precluded when the defendant had
previously been tried for the lesser offense exists when the "State is unable to proceed
on the more serious charge at the outset because the additional facts necessary to sus-
tain that charge have not occurred or have not been discovered despite the exercise of
due diligence"); see also Allan D. Vestal & DouglasJ. Gilbert, Preclusion of Duplicative Prose-
cutions: A Developing Mosaic, 47 Mo. L. REv. 1, 23-25 (1982) (noting that under the "same
transaction" test a defendant's plea of guilty or nolo contendre could allow the defend-
ant to escape the appropriate punishment); Ashe, 397 U.S. at 453 n.7 (Brennan, J., con-
curring) (noting an exception to the "same transaction" test should exist when "no
single court had jurisdiction of all the alleged crimes"); Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 224,
at 293-95 (noting thatjoinder should not be required when offenses are so complicated
that the jury will confuse the issues or when joinder would affect a defendant's other
Fifth Amendment rights, such as the right against self-incrimination).
265 Ashe, 397 U.S. at 454 (BrennanJ., concurring); William L. Carroway, Pervasive Mul-
tipe Offense Problems-A Policy Analysis, 1971 UTAH L. REV. 105, 115 (noting that the "same
transaction" test is the "most sweeping solution that could be achieved by the Court"




test also reduces the risk of an erroneous conviction because it pre-
vents a prosecutor from perfecting his or her trial strategy. More-
over, the "same transaction" test promotes judicial efficiency and
economy by reducing the overall number of trials.266 Numerous
states, either through statutes or case law, have adopted the "same
transaction" test, further underscoring the fact that the "same trans-
action" test is the preferable mechanism for deciding when a subse-
quent prosecution is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.267
The advantages of the same transaction test are further high-
lighted when applied to the factual scenarios presented in Dixon. If
the Court had applied the "same transaction" test, the criminal
prosecutions of both Dixon and Foster would have been barred be-
cause the criminal charges arose out of the same transaction as the
contempt offenses. Thus, neither defendant would have been sub-
jected to the inconveniences or the harassment of a second trial.2 68
Further, the "same transaction" test would eliminate the possibility
that Foster would be erroneously convicted for the threat counts
(the counts for which he was acquitted in initial contempt proceed-
ing) because the government had the opportunity to rehearse and
perfect its trial strategy. Furthermore, as Justice White pointed out,
joining the criminal and the contempt proceedings would not un-
dermine the integrity or the authority of the court, since the judici-
ary retained the power to incarcerate Dixon and Foster until the
prosecution was able to try the contempt and the criminal charge
together.269
Numerous commentators have dismissed the "same transac-
tion" test because, like the Grady test, it lacks a precise definition.270
266 Ashe, 397 U.S. at 454; Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529, 530 (1960); Double
Jeopardy Bar, supra note 240, at 968.
267 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(2)-(3) (1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-408(2)
(1993); FLA. R. GRIM. P. 3.151 (West 1993), HAW. REV. STAT. § 701-109(2) (1993); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.035 (West 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-503 (1993); N.Y. GRIM.
PROC. LAW § 40.40 (McKinney 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-926 (1992); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 131.505-.525 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 109-112 (1983). States that have
adopted the "same transaction" test through the judicial process include Michigan (Peo-
ple v. White, 212 N.W.2d 222 (Mich. 1973)), Pennsylvania (Commonwealth v. Campana,
314 A.2d 854, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (Pa. 1974)), Tennessee (State v. Covington, 222
S.W. 1, 2 (Tenn. 1920)), Texas (Pascahl v. State, 90 S.W. 878 (Tex. 1908)), and West
Virginia (State ex rel. Dowdy v. Robinson, 257 S.E.2d 167 (W. Va. 1979)).
268 But see Commonwealth v. Allen, 486 A.2d 363 (Pa. 1984) (noting that Pennsylvania
has an exception to its compulsory joinder statue which allows successive prosecutions
for contempt and the underlying criminal violation arising from the same conduct), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 842 (1985).
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They argue that a transaction is a malleable concept; therefore, it
enables a prosecutor to create numerous violations of the criminal
code from what in reality is a single offense.271 However, this defi-
ciency is not fatal, as guidance in applying this test can be obtained
from the common law. Under the common law principle of resjudi-
cata, a claimant is required to adjudicate all claims that can be "con-
veniently litigated at one trial" in one proceeding, and the claimant
cannot retry a factual contention under a different legal theory. 27 2
Like the same transaction test, res judicata could be labeled an im-
precise rule; however, over time courts have developed a body of
case law that clearly delineates when claims must be tried to-
gether.275 Similarly, in criminal law, "factual patterns will emerge"
that will enable the court "to determine in advance whether re-
prosecution should be barred" because all charges should have
been brought in a single proceeding.274
If the Court finds that this process is too unstable or would take
too long, the Court instead could delineate a set of specific stan-
dards that could be used in determining whether two offenses oc-
curred in the same transaction. One factor could be the defendant's
intent in committing the crime. 275 Under this notion, all crimes
committed by the defendant that require proof of the same intent
and occur in the same proximate time frame must be tried to-
gether.276 Another factor that could be used to define a transaction
is the notion of a continuous offense.277 Under this concept, once a
defendant has created an illegal situation, all further violations of
the law are considered part of that transaction until the defendant
takes positive steps to rectify the situation or until external factors
terminate the situation.278 Driving while intoxicated provides an ex-
ample of how this method would work. Once a drunk driver gets
behind the wheel of a car, he creates an illegal situation, and any
crimes committed while he is driving in this intoxicated state must
be tried together. However, if he regains sobriety and commits ad-
ditional crimes, these new offenses need not be tried with the crimes
534, 539-40 (1949); The Supreme Court, 1989 Term: Leading Cases: I. Constitutional Law; A.
Criminal Law and Procedure, 104 HARV. L. REv. 149, 157 (1990); Twice in Jeopardy, supra
note 224, at 276; Westen & Drubel, supra note 239, at 114.
271 Double Jeopardy Bar, supra note 240, at 968; Statutory Implementation, supra note 223,
at 348-49.
272 Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 224, at 296.
273 Id. at 297.
274 Id.; Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 454 n. 8 (1970).
275 Kirchheimer, supra note 270, at 540.
276 Id. at 541.
277 Id. at 540.
278 Id. at 540-41.
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committed while the defendant was intoxicated, because the initial
situation was terminated by the sobriety.2 79
The main point that the Court should recognize is that while
the "same transaction" test could be labeled as imprecise, it is ame-
nable to being further definition either through the development of
case law or by judicial guidelines. Therefore, because the "same
transaction" test affords defendants the greatest protection against
double jeopardy and because it can, through judicial interpretation,
be precisely defined, the Court in future cases should adopt the
'same transaction" test.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Dixon Court definitively ruled that the Blockburger test was
the appropriate mechanism for determining when successive prose-
cutions for the same conduct violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
However, by adopting this test, the Court did a great injustice to
defendants, because the Blockburger test does not adequately protect
them from the evils of double jeopardy. Justice Scalia attempted to
justify the adoption of the Blockburger test by stating that it comports
with how the Court has historically interpreted and applied the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Whether or not this is true, the approach
the Court has historically used in double jeopardy claims is irrele-
vant today because the definition of crimes and the nature of the
criminal justice system has changed dramatically in the last century.
This Note argues that the Court needs to refrain from engaging
in largely esoteric debates over the precedential value of vague and
confusing cases and instead should develop a test that adequately
protects the interests the clause was designed to serve-namely pro-
tecting citizens from governmental tyranny. This Note argues that
the "same transaction" test accomplishes this goal because it insures
finality by reducing the possibility that a defendant can be tried nu-
merous times for the same offense. Therefore, this Note urges the
Court to adopt the "same transaction" test, or at least adequately
justify why it refuses to do so.
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